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Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory 1
Ph.D. Gligor Bishev
*
Monetary Policy and Transition in Southeast Europe
1.   Factors determining monetary policy strategy
The region of southeast Europe consists of seven countries of which six are low
income and one is medium income economy. The average GDP per capita at market
exchange rate in 1998 was USD 1,793. The lowest GDP per capita had Albania (USD
1,110 at market exchange rate). The highest living standard in the region had Croatia, with
GDP per capita of USD 4,635 at market exchange rate (Table 1). The other five countries
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Yugoslavia) have GDP per
capita at market exchange rate in a range between USD 1,206 (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
and USD 1,690 (Macedonia).
Except Romania, which is a medium size economy, all the other six economies
are small. Their national currency areas are  unoptimum currency areas. The average
number of population within the six small southeast European economies in 1998 was 5.4
million. With Romania, the average number of population was 7.8 million. The smallest
country by population is Macedonia (2.1 million) and the largest is Romania (22.5 million).
The total GDP of the seven southeast European economies in 1998 was USD 94.92 billion
at market exchange rate, which accounts for 0.32% of the value of the world output.
Without Romania, which itself accounts for 38.8% of the output of the seven southeast
European economies, the total GDP of the other six economies was USD 58.12 billion,
and account for only 0,20% of the value of world output in 1998. The average share in the
total world output per economy, for the six small southeast European countries, is 0.033%.
Even the largest economy (Romania), has a share of 0.126% in the total world output.
With such a small size, the region as a whole and particularly, the economies within the
region are price takers and shock absorbers (Table 1).
Although small, the seven southeast European economies are quite closed.
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Average share of export and import of goods was 36.9% of GDP, in 1998. The highest
openness had Macedonia, with foreign trade accounting for 85.7% of GDP. The most
closed economy was Albania, with foreign trade to GDP of 27.0%. Such small level of
openness is unsustainable and cannot lead to high economic growth.
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Currently, one of the seven economies (Yugoslavia), is isolated from the
international community, one is aid economy (Bosnia and Herzegovina), one is semi-aid
economy (Albania), and four out of seven, are fragile transition economies (Bulgaria,
Croatia, Macedonia and Romania), dependent on international financial support.
                                                                
* Deputy Governor, National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia and Associate Professor, Faculty of
Economics – Prilep.
1 “While most of the transition countries have liberalized their economies, the Balkan region is still full of
barriers and restrictions – some imposed, some self-imposed and some inherited. The consequence has been
that the region has continued to experience trade and other real and policy-induced shocks. It has also
motivated most of the states in the region to advance either on the path of regional or on that of European
integration” – Vladimir Gligorov, “Trade in the Balkans”, The Vienna Institute Monthly Report, No. 12/1997.
2 In the small high -income economies export and import of goods is higher than the national output. Thus, in
Ireland the export and import account for 171.6% of GDP, in Belgium 139.7%, and in Netherlands the export
and import account for 108.7% of GDP.2
Table 1
Basic Indicators for Size, Opennes, Financial Depth and Currency Supstitution
of the Southeast Europe Economies
Albania
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Romania Yugoslavia Total
Total  - 
Romania
Population in million 3.40 3.30 8.31 4.60 2.10 22.50 10.70 54.91 32.41
Nominal GDP in bn USD at 
market exchange rate 3.77 3.98 12.20 21.32 3.55 36.80 13.30 94.92 58.12
GDP per capita at market 
exchange rate 1,110 1,206 1.468 4,635 1,690 1,635 1,243 1,729 1,793
Share of GDP in world 
output in % at market 
exchange rate 0.009 0.013 0.044 0.073 0.012 0.126 0.045 0.324 0.198
Total trade (Export + Import 
of goods) in million USD 1,020 2,798 8,923 13,386 3,044 19,000 7,700 55,871 36,871
Share in total world 
trade in% 0.009 0.026 0.083 0.126 0.028 0.178 0.072 0.524 0.346
Share of total trade 
in GDP in% 27.00 70.20 73.30 62.80 85.70 51.60 57.90 58.85 63.43
M1 to GDP in % 19.70 3.75 10.40 9.70 8.40 5.10 7.60 10.50 10.70
M2 to GDP in % 42.50 18.91 26.70 40.10 13.90 21.80 10.20 26.70 26.80
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 - Coefficients M1 to GDP, M2 to GDP, foreign currency deposits to M1, foreign currency deposits to M2,
   are calculated based on the 12 month average for the money supply.
*/ Including frozen (blocked) foreign currency deposits.
**/ Average is calculated without including Yugoslavia.
 - Year 1998 -3
Financial markets in all seven southeast European economies are very shallow.
Also, there is an evidence for a very high currency and asset substitution. The main
indicator for financial market depth, M2 to GDP rate, is low. Thus, the average rate of M2 to
GDP for the seven southeast European countries was 26.7% in 1998. The lowest rate of
M2 to GDP had Yugoslavia (10.2%) and Macedonia (13.9%). The rate of financial depth,
although reached 42.5% in Albania and 40.1% in Croatia, was half of the one in the
matured market economies. Furthermore, the share of the narrowest definition of M1 in
GDP is very law also, which is measure for the degree of monetization of the economy.
Average M1 to GDP rate, was 10.5%, which is half of the  monetization in the matured
market economies. Except Albania, where the rate of monetization (19.7%) approached
the standard level, in other six southeast European countries it is below 10%. The lowest
M1 to GDP rate have Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.7%) and Romania (5.10). The low
monetization simultaneously is an indicator for high currency substitution.
Asset and currency substitution is widespread within the seven southeast
European countries.
3 Currency substitution occurs when assets denominated in foreign
currency are used as means of payment, while asset substitution occurs when assets
denominated in foreign currency serve as store of value. As an indicator for currency
substitution we use the rate of foreign currency deposits to the narrowest definition of
money supply – M1. For asset substitution we use the indicator: the share of foreign
currency deposits in the broader definition of money supply – M2. These indicators can be
misleading, however. Foreign currency in circulation, in some of these countries, is a
major component of currency and asset substitution, but it is unmeasured. Thus, we are
constrained to foreign currency deposits, which can be measured. The figures for
currency and asset substitution are presented in Table 1. The rates of currency and asset
substitution within the seven southeast European countries are one of the highest within
the transition economies. The average rate of currency substitution (foreign currency
deposits to M1) is 107.6%. This means that on one unit national currency on average there
is one unit foreign currency, which is used as means of payments. The ratio of currency
substitution ranges between 45 percent (Albania 45.0%, Macedonia 45.8%) and 265%
percent (Croatia). Bulgaria and Romania have currency substitution rates of 107.9% and
127.9%, respectively. The average rate of asset substitution (foreign currency deposits to
M2) is 42.5%, which presets that on each unit of savings in national currency, there is
almost half unit of savings in foreign currency. The leading asset substitution countries are
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Bulgaria, with rates of 80.3%, 64.2% and 42.1%,
respectively. The asset substitution is less dominant in Albania (20.9%), Macedonia
(27.3%) and Romania (29.7%). Yugoslavia is excluded from this analysis because there is
no reliable figure for foreign currency deposits. Namely, in the available figures for foreign
currency deposits, frozen foreign currency deposits are included also, although the
repayment of these deposits is government liability.
         High currency and asset substitution, as a consequence have high volatility of
the velocity of money supply. In such circumstances monetary growth targets are
inefficient method for controlling the inflation. There is no correlation between money
supply growth and inflation growth. Neither narrow, nor broad definition of money supply
can not be used as an indicator for future inflation.
                                                                
3 Currency and asset substitution (dollarization), the holding by residents of a significant share of their assets
in foreign-currency-denominated form, is a common feature of developing and transition economies. It is a
response to economic and political instability and high inflation, and to the desire of domestic residents to
diversify their asset portfolios. In countries experiencing high inflation, dollarization is typically quite
widespread, as the public seeks protection from the cost of holding assets denominated in domestic currency.
But remarkably, the increase in dollarization in some Latin American and Asian countries has continued and
even accelerated in recent years following successful stabilization. – See: “Exchange Rate Arrangements and
Economic Performance in Developing Countries”, World Economic Outlook, October 1997, pp. 78-97.4
2. Monetary policy stance
The seven southeast European countries do not pursue the same monetary policy
strategy as a tool for bringing down and controlling inflation. Four of them (Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia) are pursuing rule based monetary policy
with a deutsche mark as an anchor. The money supply is an endogenous variable in this
monetary policy rule. The monetary approach to the balance of payment gives a useful
framework for an exchange rate targeting model (For a collection of the seminal papers in
this area, see Frenkel and Johnson, 1978). The key characteristics and assumptions for
this monetary policy rule are retained as follows: first, asset market equilibrium lies at the
center of the model, where the asset in question is money and where the demand for
money function at least in the anchor currency country is stable, and the supply of money
is determined by the monetary authorities.
The exchange rate targeting monetary policy rule can be expressed by the following
equation (Stevenson, Muscatelli and Gregory, 1988, pp. 265-281):
      e = m - m* - ly + ly* - r*r* + rr                             (1)
where: e is the nominal exchange rate; m is nominal money demand; y is real income; r is
interest rate; l and r are parameters; and * denotes world variables (variables in anchor
currency country).
The central feature of the exchange rate targeting monetary policy strategy is that
the exchange rate is determined in the money market of the two economies: domestic and
anchor currency country, and in particular by the relative money supplies, the exchange
rate being the relative price of two monies. The Central Bank in an exchange rate targeting
strategy by accepting that the exchange rate is an intermediate target , simultaneously
accepts that it will not implement monetary policy that is independent from the anchor
currency country. This means that the money supply in the domestic country becomes
endogenous variable determined by the money supply in the anchor currency country in
order to keep the stability of the exchange rate. Thus, the price stability (inflation) in
domestic country is determined by the money supply growth in anchor currency country
(Kool, Tatom, 1994).
The other three southeast European economies (Albania, Romania and
Yugoslavia) opted for a monetary policy rule based on money growth target (monetary
targeting strategy). This monetary policy strategy is using money supply as an instrument
to maintain price stability. The Quantity theory of money provides an analytical framework
for implementation of this strategy. The simple Quantity Theory’s equation of exchange is:
P = M (V/Y)     (2)
where: P denotes the price level; M is domestic money stock; Y is real output and V is the
velocity of money. According to the Quantity theory, V and Y are determined independently,
and, more importantly, both are independent of the money stock. The real output (Y) is
determined by the supply side of the economy – the amount and productivity of the labor
force, capital equipment, land and technology – and velocity V is stable. Then the theory
implies that changes in the money supply will be fully reflected in the price changes. In a
dynamic context, this means that changes in domestic monetary growth will be fully
reflected in changes in the inflation rate (money is neutral in its effect on real output).5
Table 2
Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Policy Strategy
Country Exchange rate regime Monetary strategy
1995             1996 1997                 1998 1995         1996 1997          1998
Albania Floating exchange rate Money growth target
Bosnia and Herzegovina ... Irrevocably fixed 
exchange rate against 
deutsche mark
… Currency board
Bulgaria Floating exchange 
rate
July 97 irrevocably 




July 97 currency 
board
Croatia De facto target band vis-à-vis deutsche mark Exchange rate target
Macedonia De facto target peg to deutsche mark Exchange rate target
Romania Floating exchange rate Money growth target
Yugoslavia ... Money growth target




t = a(m – m*)t-1 + d(y – y*)t-1                         (3)
where: pt 
e
 is  the expected rate of inflation in period t, m is money supply, m* denotes
money demand, y is current output, y* is potential output (full employment output), t-1 is
previous period, and a and d are parameters that determine the slope of the curve. The
expected rate of inflation depends on two factors: a) the gap between the current and
potential growth (unemployment), and b) the gap between the equilibrium growth rate
(demand for money) and current growth rate of money. The higher the gap between the
equlibrium rate of growth and current growth rate of money supply the higher is the
expected rate of inflation in period t. Hence, contrary to the exchange rate targeting
strategy, price stability in the domestic country, in the monetary targeting strategy, is
determined by the growth rate of domestic money supply. In case a country opted for an
independent monetary policy,  then the monetary targeting strategy is linked with a floating
exchange rate regime.
Three key preconditions, important for practical implementation of the monetary
targeting strategy are: existence of stable and predictable money demand; existence of
strong and predictable relationship between money supply and price level; and strict
control over the money supply from monetary authorities. Except the last assumption, the
other two preconditions do not exist in any of the seven southeast European countries, due
to the high currency and asset substitution, which is reflected in very unstable money
demand. Thus, the current growth rate of money supply can not be used as an indicator
for future inflation. Although the first two assumptions were not fulfilled and the third
assumption was partly fulfilled, Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia choose monetary
targeting rule as a strategy for controlling the inflation.
Thus in 1998 the following monetary policy strategies were prevailing in the seven
southeast European countries: exchange rate targeting strategy in four countries, of which
in two – Croatia and Macedonia, fixed but adjustable exchange rate against deutsche mark
served as an intermediate target, in the period 1995-1998. In the other two countries –
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria, irrevocably fixed exchange rate against deutsche
mark, since mid 1997 has been adopted as intermediate target. Furthermore, in these two
countries a currency board has been introduced as a mechanism of money supply
issuance due to the inability of national central banks to control monetary growth on long-
run. The third group of countries, consist of Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia, which in the6
analyzed period (1995-1998), were pursuing monetary targeting strategy in combination
with floating exchange rate regime.
4
Figure 1
Monetary Framework: Money Supply and Inflation
I. Currency Board: Money Supply Growth Rate and Rate of Inflation
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4 Yugoslavia in the analyzed period formaly proclaimed fixed exchange rate regime of its national currency
against deutsche mark. But, market exchange rate, through which the foreign exchange transactions have been
executed  was permanently overshooting the proclaimed fix exchange rate. Furthermore, the Central Bank has
not defended the announced exchange rate. Thus, de facto, floating (permanently depreciating) exchange rate
regime has been in place.7
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The main messages from Figure 1 are the following:
1.  There is very weak correlation between money supply and inflation in all seven countries
due to unstable money demand. Thus, the money supply growth rate can not be used as
an indicator for future inflation. Furthermore, monetary based stabilization would be
inefficient and money growth targets can not coordinate the decision making process of
economic agents.
 
2.  Exchange rate targeting strategies were very efficient in bringing down and controlling the
inflation, regardless the money supply has been controlled by the national monetary
authorities or by the currency board mechanism. Thus, in two countries that conduct
exchange rate targeting strategy, based on fixed but adjustable exchange rate against
deutsche mark, the achieved rate of inflation is equal to the industrial countries level
(average rate of inflation was 4.1% in Croatia and 3.2% in Macedonia), in last five years.
After the adoption of currency board, the rate of inflation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Bulgaria, converged to the industrial countries inflation rates, also (rate of inflation of 5.8%
and 1%, respectively, in 1998).
 
3.  By accepting exchange rate targeting strategy, the Central Banks of four southeast
European countries, subordinate their monetary policies, especially the issuance of money
supply, to the exchange rate objective. They are unable to target any other nominal variable9
on a lasting basis, especially in the presence of capital mobility. But, there is an important
difference between the countries that are implementing currency board and countries that
are pursuing pure exchange rate targeting strategy. The former, by adopting irrevocably
fixed exchange rate of national currency against deutsche mark as intermediate monetary
policy target, give up from the usage of the exchange rate as means for balance of
payment adjustment and instrument to neutralize external shocks. Although policymakers
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria do not dispose with alternative devices that can
be used for balance of payments adjustment and for neutralizing asymmetric demand and
supply shocks, they adopted currency board mechanism, based on irrevocably fixed
exchange rate, as automatic mechanism for money supply issuance. Furthermore, at the
period of introduction, the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) of their national
currencies was unknown.
5 In the year of introduction of currency board, the prevailing
exchange rate did not refer to the economy, which was regarded as being in external and
internal equlibrium. To the contrary, the introduction of a currency board system in Bulgaria
occurred in a period of very high internal and external imbalances (hyperinflation, huge
current account and fiscal deficits). In Bosnia and Herzegovina currency board was
established after four and a half years of war and totally destroyed economy. The only
means for balance of payments adjustment in these two countries are expenditure
reducing policies and deflationary and recessionary effects on domestic output during the
period of correction, which can take a long time if the degree of wage and price flexibility is
limited.
 
  The other two countries (Croatia and Macedonia) adopted fixed but adjustable
exchange rate as an intermediate target. This means, that although the exchange rate is
used as nominal anchor, it can still be used as means for equilibrating the balance of
payments, when disequlibria is caused by fundamentals, in order to prevent the short term
costs of deflationary effects reflected in domestic output during the correction period. Of
course, the changes of exchange rate can not be substitution for expenditure reducing
policies and structural reforms.
 
4.  The monetary targeting strategy appeared as an inefficient strategy for bringing down and
controlling the inflation. The inflation in this group of countries remained two digit. The
average inflation rate in the countries with monetary growth target was 44.7% in the period
1995-1998, ranging from 18.5% in Albania, to 46.5% in Yugoslavia, and 69.2% in Romania.
Furthermore, Central Banks in these countries do not succeed to establish control over the
money supply growth in long run. Monetary growth in all three economies remained high,
and average rate was in a range between 37.3% in Albania and 72.8% in Romania, for the
period 1995-1998.
5.  The monetary authorities which pursued exchange rate targeting strategy established
firm control over the monetary growth and regained credibility of monetary policy. This lead
to the reduction of currency and asset substitution in these economies, although it still
                                                                
 
5 The fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) is the exchange rate that is consistent with
macroeconomic balance in medium-term, meaning the simultaneous achievement of internal and external
balance. Internal balance implies acceptance of the historically determined wage rate and achievement of a
level of effective demand such as to sustain the potential full-employment output consistent with the control
of inflation. External equilibrium is defined in terms of a sustainable value of the current account balance. The
medium term in this context means the period needed for output to return to potential and for changes in
competitiveness to be reflected in trade volumes, which would appear to be in the range of four to six years.
See: John Williamson, “Estimates of FEERs”, in John Williamson, Editor, “Estimating Equlibrium Exchange
Rates, Institute For International Economics, Washington, September 1994, pp. 177-244; and Tamim Bayoumi,
Peter Clark, Steve Symansky, and Mark Taylor, “The Robustness of Equlibrium Exchange Rate Calculations to
Alternative Assumptions and Methodologies”, in John Williamson, Editor, “Estimating Equlibrium Exchange
Rates, Institute For International Economics, Washington, September 1994, pp. 19-59.10
remains high. Due to the  remonetization, the money supply growth rates were much
higher than the rate of inflation in the four southeast European countries with exchange
rate target. Thus the growth rate of broad money – M2, was almost ten times higher than
the inflation rate in Croatia during the period 1995-1998. In the same period, in Macedonia,
monetary growth was three times higher than the inflation rate. After the introduction of
currency board, the money supply growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina was four times
higher than the rate of inflation, and in Bulgaria, growth rate of money supply was
overshooting the rate of inflation by ten times.
6. As an anchor currency deutsche mark has been adopted, in all cases where the
exchange rate was used as an intermediate target. Thus, the monetary policy in domestic
countries was dependent on the monetary policy in Germany. Since 1
st of January 1999,
monetary policy in these countries, through the irrevocably fixed exchange rate of the
deutsche mark against the Euro, has become dependent on the monetary policy of the
European Central Bank (ECB). The adoption of the deutsche mark as an anchor currency
was based on three key factors: first, all these countries have the most intensive trade and
financial links with EU countries, and especially with Germany, second, the demand for
money, for deutsche mark, currently for the Euro is stable, and third, monetary policy in
Germany, and currently in  Euroland is oriented towards price stability and is credible.
Thus, by the exchange rate targeting strategy, the four southeast European countries are
importing the credibility of the European Central Bank. The desire to “borrow” credibility
and low inflation reputation of the Bundesbank and ECB was the main criteria for adopting
either fix but adjustable or irrevocably fixed exchange rate regime. Other criteria were less
important.
Figure 2
Monetary Framework: Interest Rates and Inflation
I. Currency Board: Money Market Rate, Lending Rate and Inflation Rate
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High interest rates were the primary tool for defeating and controlling the inflation.
The reduction of interest rates was possible after the confidence was restored and the low
rates of inflation became permanent. In cases where the interest rates were reduced
before the permanent defeat of inflation, it reappeared at higher level. That was mainly the13
case in three southeast European countries that were pursuing monetary targeting
strategy. Stop and go monetary policy in these countries produced high and variable
inflation, which was connected with high economic and social costs.
6 The pace of
reduction of interest rates in four southeast European countries, conducting exchange rate
targeting strategy, mainly was determined by the need to keep exchange rate peg and the
scope of net capital inflow.
7 Furthermore, the monetary policies based on exchange rate
target produced higher interest rate volatility on money market, which was the cost for
exchange rate stability. The priority was given to maintain the exchange rate peg, and
interest rates were subordinated to this goal. Excessive money market volatility has been




Real GDP And GDP Per Capita At Market Exchange Rate













Albania 80.9 757 88.2 840 82.0 692 88.6 1,110
Bosnia and Herzegovina ... 686 ... 866 ... 1,012 ... 1,206
Bulgaria 79.7 1,558 71.6 1,184 66.6 1,224 69.0 1,468
Croatia 67.3 4,000 71.4 4,422 76.0 4,348 78.1 4,635
Macedonia 67.8 2,228 68.3 2,206 69.3 1,856 71.4 1,690
Romania 84.8 1,565 88.2 1,539 82.1 1,533 76.1 1,635
Yugoslavia 44.2 1,852 46.8 1,299 50.3 1,479 51.6 1,243
(For real GDP Indices, 1989=100)
 Growth performance of the southeast European countries was very poor,
regardless of the monetary policy regime. At the end of 1998, the region as a whole, and
each country in particular did not reach the pre-transition level (1989) of GDP. Closest to
the pre-transition level of GDP were Albania (88.6%) and Croatia (78.1%). The GDP level
in Yugoslavia, in 1998, was only half of its pre-transition level. In Bulgaria, Macedonia and
Romania, the GDP level in 1998, in comparison to their pre-transition level was 69.0%,
71.4% and 76.1%, respectively (Economic Commission For Europe, 1999, No. 2, p. 65).
The countries (Croatia and Macedonia), that during the whole analyzed period (95-98)
were pursuing exchange rate targeting strategy, achieved average annual growth of 3.2%.
While growth rate in Macedonia has been permanently accelerating, growth rate in Croatia
in 1998 decelerate. The average growth rate of the three southeast European countries
that have been pursuing monetary targeting strategy in the period 1995 -1998, reached to
3.6%. In Albania the average growth rate was 5.5% and was volatile. There was no growth
in the analyzed period in Romania, whereas, the average growth in Yugoslavia was 5.5%,
with decelerating trend which started in 1998. In Bulgaria, before the introduction of
currency board, due to the financial crisis and high price instability the growth was
negative. The contraction of output continued in 1997 when the currency board was
adopted. In 1998 the growth was restored and it reached 3.5%.
                                                                
6 “Inflation is a disease, a dangerous and sometimes fatal disease, a disease that if not checked in time can
destroy a society.” – Milton Friedman and Roose Friedman, “Free to Choose: A Personal Statement”,
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, p. 253.
7 Net capital inflow is equal to capital inflow minus capital outflow.
8 The consequence of the choice of exchange rate regime is the change in the distribution of short term
volatility between the foreign exchange market and the short term money market. – Mills, Wood, 1993, p.5)14
 Structural and institutional reforms are very important for restoring growth, on long
term base, in the region. In Yugoslavia they even have not been started. In the other six
countries, the structural reforms were almost halted since 1997 due to the turmoil in
emerging markets and recently due to the Kosovo crisis which severely hit the seven
economies of southeast Europe. The strength of commitment to market supporting
institutional reforms was very weak. The Kosovo crisis has highlighted the critical
importance of the capacity of the state to enforce laws and curb corruption, to collect
taxes, to regulate banks and financial markets, to implement bankruptcies, to promote
enterprise restructuring and effective corporate governance, and to build the social
foundations for a well-functioning market economy. These are the key challenges of the
next phase of transition and they remain at the top of the agenda for all countries of the
region.
 The transition indicators presented in Table 4 for the southeast European
countries show a significant slow pace of overall progress towards well-functioning market
economy. Furthermore, there are more frequent instances of backtracking on previously
implemented reforms. In the area of privatization, the small-scale privatization is virtually
complete, but the large-scale privatization has been sluggish, while the privatization or
closure of large loss-making enterprises remains a major challenge.
Constrained by poor corporate governance and weak financial discipline, enterprise
reform has continued to lag behind other dimensions of structural reforms. Unprofitable
enterprises continue to receive support through “soft budget constraints”, including weak
enforcement of bankruptcy and tolerance of tax, electricity and water supply arrears.
Corporate governance and lack of competition remain key obstacles to enterprise
restructuring and sustainable growth. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of weak
corporate governance has been the lack of transparency and accountability evident in
enterprises across the region. However, weak corporate governance and weak financial
discipline, not only constrain progress in fiscal and financial sector reform, but also expose
seven southeast European countries to economic instability, putting the hard-won gains of
the transition process at a risk.
Financial sector remains shallow, underdeveloped and weak. The banking sector is
fragile, and is characterised by a lack of financial intermediation. Due to weak lending
practices, bad loans are major problem for all seven countries.  Securitization and
development of capital markets is still weak.
The tasks in the area of structural reforms – promoting sound corporate govenance
and enterprise restructuring, deepening and effectively regulating financial markets,
strengthening the fiscal system, building and adequate social safety net and fostering the
rule of law – are of such magnitude and complexity that they cannot be completed
overnight. Although rules, procedures and organizations can often be set in place rather
quickly, the capacity of institutions to change expectations and shape behaviour – hence
their effectiveness – can be developed only over the long term. Effective structural reforms
require investments in the development of individual skills (human capital) and
accumulation of experience by learning and doing to alter entrenched patterns of behaviour
and practices within society. As a result, the time needed for these reforms is substantially
longer than the time required for the policy reforms and redistribution of state-owned
assets associated with the first phase of transition (EBRD, Transition Report 1998, p. 23).15
Table 4
Progress in Transition in Southeast European Countries
 - Transition Indicators for 1998 - 




Private sector share 


























Albania 3.2 75 2 4 2 3 4 2 2 2-
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.1 35 2 2 2- 3 2 1 2 1
Bulgaria 8.3 50 3 3 2+ 3 4 2 3- 2
Croatia 4.5 55 3 4+ 3- 3 4 2 3- 2+
Macedonia 2.0 55 3 4 2 3 4 1 3 2-
Romania 22.5 60 3- 3+ 2 3 4 2 1+ 2
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Transition Report 1998", P.26.
               1 Is the lawest progress.
               4+ Is highest progress.16
2. Euroization
The southeast European countries belong to Europe not only normatively but also
economically.  The European Union is the largest trading partner for the region as a whole
and for each particular country. Trade with EU-15 accounts for 30.7% of the regions’ GDP
or 53.8% of total world trade of the region. Albania is the most dependant country on EU. It
exchanges with EU 64.1% of its total world trade (23.1% of GDP). The medium-size
Romania, exchanges with EU 64.1% of its total world trade (33.1% of GDP). Trade with EU
accounts for half of the total trade of Bulgaria and Croatia. The other three countries
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Yugoslavia) exchange with EU between 39.0%
and 42.0%, of their total world trade (Table 5).
The importance of the EU for the region can be proved also from the ratio – the value
of trade turnover with the EU per capita. This ratio for the region as a whole was USD 551
(Euro 488 – value of trade with the EU per inhabitant). The value of this ratio is
considerably higher than the one for Moldova and Ukraine. It is about Euro 190 higher than
the ratio in the CIS, where the value of trade with the EU per inhabitant is less than Euro
400. Just for comparison, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia, this
figure oscillates from Euro 1,300 to 2,300 per inhabitant. In Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania,
the amount is around Euro 700-900 per inhabitant (Butorina, 1998). Regarding the value of
trade with the EU per inhabitant, the southeast European countries can be classified in
three groups. The first group includes only Croatia, with trade with EU per inhabitant above
Euro 1,000 (Euro 1,386). The second group consists of three countries (Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Romania) with volume of trade with EU of around Euro 500 per inhabitant. The
third group is comprised of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia. Their
volume of trade with EU is around Euro 250 per inhabitant.
Contrary to the high trading and economic links with EU, there is small volume of
trade within the countries of southeast Europe. For many southeast European countries
the other southeast European countries are not important trading partners. Furthermore,
for almost no southeast European country is another southeast European country the
main trading partner. In rare cases, for some southeast European countries the other
southeast European countries are not trading partners at all (Gligorov, 1997, p. 3).
9
                                                                
9 Instead of the seven countries of southeast Europe in our analysis, Gligorov is considering ten countries
consisting the Balkans: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Greece and Turkey. His findings about the trade within the region are following: “For many Balkan countries
the other Balkan countries are not important trading partners. In Table 1 a lot of zeros can be observed. They
do not always represent an absolute absence of trade but rather levels that are so low (much lower than 1%)
that they are  not worth  mentioning. From this it follows that currently the Balkans are not a trade creating
region…For some Balkan countries the other Balkan countries are not trading partners at all.” – Vladimir
Gligorov, “Trade in the Balkans”, The Vienna Institute Monthly Report, No.12/1997.17
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The main message of Table 5 is that the prosperity of the southeast European
region, and of each country within the region, depends on the developments in the EU. The
EU is the largest market and is locomotive for the growth in the region. Close trade
relationships with EU do not allow the countries in the region to pursue different
macroeconomic policy and especially monetary policy than the one in their main trading
partner. Monetary policy has to be subordinated to the monetary policy of the ECB, taking
in mind that all southeast European countries are small and do not represent an optimum
currency area. Even the region as a whole is not an optimum currency area. As such the
countries in the region cannot conduct independent monetary policy.
In such circumstances, the only possible simple rule for conducting monetary
policy is exchange rate targeting. This is the only efficient monetary policy rule that can
maintain internal and external balance consistent with the potential growth and low
inflation.
10 Furthermore, exchange rate targeting as monetary policy rule will produce swift
convergence of the economic performances of southeast European countries to the ones
in EU. However, in the process of designing the exchange rate targeting strategy, the
monetary authorities should have in mind the following factors:
1.  At least for a decade, due to the diminishing returns on capital and low starting
base, growth potential in the countries of southeast Europe will be much higher
than the growth potential in EU.
                                                                
10 “An efficient rule for monetary policy is one that minimizes a weighted sum of output variance and inflation
variance.” – Laurence Ball, “Efficient Rules for Monetary Policy”, John Hopkins University, January 1997, p. 3.18
2.  Complete large scale restructuring in the countries of the region will take place.
This means that fundamentals of the economies, which in long-run depend on
exchange rate regime and real exchange rate will be considerably changed.
 11
3.  Economic growth is expected to be accelerated by broad liberalization and
opening of the countries in the southeast Europe and their integration in EU.
The empirical evidence overwhelmingly proves the links between openness and
economic growth. According to the empirical evidence the economies have
grown faster on average after liberalization and their global integration, in both
the short and long run. The regional integration between small and developing
economies lead to slower growth, especially in short run.
12 Due to this, the
acceleration of growth and maintaining the stability in the region requires its’
integration in EU.
4.  Reduction of the currently high currency and asset substitution due to the
regained credibility of monetary policy will considerably increase the money
demand in the countries of the region in medium term. This will lead to high
growth of money supply, which will not only overshoot the inflation, but also
considerably overcome the monetary growth in EU.
5.  By excessively high interest rates, even overvalued exchange rate can become
an equilibrium exchange rate. The lower current growth than the potential
growth will be the outcome. The interest rates will fall down, and exchange rate
will remain stable, only if nominal wages are altered. With sufficient wage and
price flexibility, the decline in prices (deflation) will lead to lower nominal wages
and increased international competitiveness. If wages and prices are not very
flexible downwards, this will require considerable time and considerable
duration of the recession and longer-term lower current growth than the
potential (De Grauwe, 1992, p. 42).
13
                                                                
11 “We examine the mean-reverting properties of real exchange rates, by comparing the unit root properties of
a group of international real exchange rates with two groups of international real exchange rates. Strikingly, we
find that while the international real rates taken as a group appear mean reverting, the intranational rates are
not. This is consistent with the view that while nominal shocks may be mean reverting over the medium term,
underlying real factors do generate long-term trends in real exchange rates.” – Tamim Bayoumi and Ronald
Macdonald, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 46, No. 1, March 1999.;
“This section develops a model of real exchange rate determination that allows for both real and nominal
factors to play a role in the short run. In the long run, however, only real factors – the “fundamentals” –
influence the equlibrium real exchange rate.” – Sebastian Edwards, “Real and Monetary Determinants of Real
Exchange Rate Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Developing Countries”, in John Williamson, Editor,
Estimating Equlibrium Exchange Rates, Institute for International Economics, September 1994, Washington, p.
62.
12For more details see: Athanasios Vamvakidis, “Regional Trade Agreements or Broad Liberalization: Which
Path Leads to Faster Growth?”, IMF Staff  Papers, Vol. 46, No. 1, March 1999, pp. 42-68.; Maurice Schiff and L.
Alan Winters, “Dynamics and Politics in Regional Integration Arrangements: An Introduction”, The World
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 1998, pp. 177-195.; Raquel Fernandez and Jonathan Portes,
“Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements”, The World
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 1998, pp. 197-220.
13 “In any given situation there is an equilibrium rate corresponding to each rate of interest and level of
effective demand, and any rate of exchange, within very wide limits, can be turned into the equilibrium rate by
altering the rate of interest appropriately. Moreover, any rate of exchange can be made compatible with any
rate of interest provided that money wages can be sufficiently altered. The notion of the equilibrium exchange
rate is a chimera. The rate of exchange, the rate of interest, the level of effective demand and the level of
money wages react upon each other like the balls in Marshall’s bowl, and no one is determined unless all the
rest are given.” – Joan Robinson, “The Foreign Exchanges”, In Joan Robinson, Essays in the Theory of
Employment, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, London, 1947, p. 103.19
All these factors are against adopting irrevocably fixed exchange rate as
intermediate exchange rate target and currency board as automatic issuance mechanism
in the seven southeast European countries. If these factors are neglected and currency
board is adopted, inflation will be under control, but there is a risk the economic growth to
be below the potential growth. In the previous part of this analysis we presented evidence
that fixed but adjustable exchange rate, as intermediate monetary policy target is as
efficient in controlling the inflation as currency board. Furthermore, this strategy does not
undermine the economic growth, although it allows changes of the exchange rate in rare
cases, justified by fundamentals (real factors), only. Thus, in short run through the relation
called uncovered interest rate parity, the exchange rate peg will be maintained. In long run,
through the relative prices of goods, exchange rates will be determined by fundamentals
(C. J. Neely, 1994, p. 24).
The basic mechanism through which the exchange rate peg will be maintained will
be capital inflow and outflow determined by the interest rate changes on the domestic
money market. The interest rates will regulate the contribution of domestic credits to the
monetary growth. Due to the interest elasticity of the money demand (unstable money
demand) in the countries in the region, by a relatively small changes in interest rates,
domestic money demand can be equalized to the money demand in the anchor currency
country.
Thus, when there will be a pressure for exchange rate appreciation, the national
Central Bank will increase the liquidity on the domestic money market. This will lead to
reduction of the money market interest rates, which will destimulate the capital inflow.
Contrary, capital outflow will be stimulated. Reduced interest rates, simultaneously, will
increase the contribution of domestic credits to the money supply growth, on one side, and
they will lead to an increase in the money demand, on the other side, due to the high
interest elasticity of the income velocity of money.
The reaction of the national Central Bank in the seven southeast European
countries will be opposite in the case if there is a pressure for exchange rate depreciation.
In that case the Central Bank will reduce the liquidity on the domestic money market, which
will lead to the interest rates increase. This will encourage the capital inflow and
discourage the capital outflow, which will restore the balance at the foreign exchange
market at the current exchange rate. Simultaneously, increased interest rates will reduce
the contribution of domestic credits to the monetary growth and reduce the money demand
due to the interest rate sensitivity of the velocity.
Hence, the stability of the exchange rate will be automatically maintained, which
would be reflected in the low and stable inflation. The cost is higher volatility of the money
market interest rates. The monetary authorities will be obliged to follow this monetary
policy rule which ensures stability of the exchange rate through the very simple
mechanism the strict implementation of which can be very easily checked. Shocks to the
economy cannot, therefore, put pressure on exchange rate, but will automatically be
translated into variations in net foreign holdings of the Central Bank, and hence will
influence money aggregates and monetary growth (Whitley, 1994, pp. 252-253).
The anchor currency for the seven southeast European countries should become
the Euro, immediately, due to their close economic links to the EU and their strong will to
join this economic and political integration. This requires, all seven southeast European
countries, immediately to join the present version of the current exchange rate mechanism
of EU countries, known as ERM2, to which Denmark and Greece belong. But, each
southeast European country cannot unilaterally change its exchange rate. Once the
exchange rate is fixed, future changes can occur only if the agreement with the monetary20
authorities within EU is reached.
14 Through such mechanism, misuse of the exchange
rate changes will be prevented. Expenditure reducing policies and structural reforms will
be preferred instead of the exchange rate changes. The latter will be used as means of
last resort, in order to prevent the deflationary effects on the output, in cases when it is
justified by fundamentals.
Figure 3
























Basic Aim of the Central Bank:
Stabilizing of the Exchange Rate
In order to implement efficient and strict rule based monetary policy, in all seven
southeast European countries, new institutional arrangements for the monetary system
will be adopted immediately. They have to secure full independence of Central Banks
identical to the independence of the European System of Central Banks. The national
Central Banks should dispose with full institutional and functional independence. The
former means that through the institutional arrangements for the election process of the
                                                                
14 “To help new applicants adapt, they have to join the present version of the exchange rate mechanism,
known as ERM2, to which Denmark and Greece belong. But the new comers would have scope to change their
exchange rate, in agreement with the Euro countries”. – Pedro Solbes Mira, EU commissioner for economic
and monetary affairs, The Financial Times, 1999, p. 12.21
governor of the Central Bank, the term of office of the governor, and the relations of the
Central Bank with the Government, the Ministry of Finance and the Parliament, the
independence of the Central Bank is guaranteed. The later means that the Central Bank is
fully independent in selecting the monetary policy strategy for maintaining price stability, in
setting up the intermediate target and in unlimited usage of the monetary policy
instruments, including the changes of interest rates. Also, it will be prohibited, through the
institutional arrangements, government deficits to be monetized.
Such monetary policy rule connected with full central bank independence will
ensure swift convergence of the monetary performances in southeast European countries
to the monetary performances in the EU countries. Thus, economically speaking, through
the regime of fixed but adjustable exchange rate of their national currencies against the
Euro, the seven southeast European economies will become in de facto monetary union
with Euroland. The monetary policy in the countries in the region will be closely linked with
the monetary policy of ECB. The temporal deviations from the monetary union with
Euroland will occur in the periods of the exchange rate changes, in case they are justified
by fundamentals and agreed with the ECB. High labor mobility and wage flexibility will be
the main instruments for neutralizing the external shocks and equlibrating current account
of the balance of payments in the medium term. In exceptional cases, the changes of the
exchange rate can also be used for neutralizing strong external shocks, if an agreement
with ECB is achieved. Once the structural reforms are completed, and the real exchange
rate becomes mean-reverting, irrevocably fixed exchange rate regime will be adopted. This
will definitely mean, that the country is qualified to introduce the Euro as its national
currency.
Joining the ERM2 of the southeast European countries will mean starting a process
of economic and political integration in the region and particularly their integration in EU. In
general, the process of the integration in EU has to be driven by the political conviction that
an integrated region will be safer, more stable and more prosperous than a fragmented
region out of Europe. In this sense, the euroization could become an important symbol of
political and social integration of the region in Europe. It could serve as a catalyst for high
economic growth and employment.22
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A P P E N D I X:
Main economic indicators for:
-  Albania






Basic Economic Indicators for Albania
1995 1996 1997 1998
Population (in mln) 3.20 3.20 3.30 3.40
Nominal GDP (in USD bn) 2.4 2.7 2.3 3.8
Rates of real GDP growth 13.3 9.1 -7.0 8.0
Rates of inflation Dec./Dec.  6.0 17.4 42.1 8.7
Current account deficit (in USD mln) 36.6 -62.4 -256.1 -65.0
Total import of goods (in USD mln) 679.8 922.0 693.5 811.7
Total export of goods (in USD mln) 204.8 243.7 158.6 208.0
Total import of goods from EU (in USD mln) n.a. 641.2 538.0 684.0
Total export of goods in EU (in USD mln) n.a. 179.3 128.0 191.5
Stock of M1 - end of period (Dec.) (in ALL mln) 59,253 90,405 91,667 83,729
Growth rates of M1 Dec./Dec.  52.8 52.6 1.4 -8.7
Stock of M2 - end of period (Dec.) (in ALL mln) 84,779 120,646 162,222 199,263
Growth rates of M2 Dec./Dec. 49.7 42.3 34.5 22.8
Total foreign currency deposits - end of period (Dec.) (in ALL mln) 20,080 33,906 36,326 40,263
Money market interest rates - end of period (Dec.) in % … … … …
Weighted lending interest rates - end of period (Dec.) in % 21.0 28.8 43.0 25.0
Exchange rate against USD, end of period (Dec.) (ALL/USD) 94.2 103.1 149.1 140.6
Exchange rate regime  floating 
Fiscal deficit as % of GDP -10.2 -12.8 -12.9 -10.4
Source: Bank of Albania26
Basic economic indicators for Bosnia and Herzegovina
1995 1996 1997 1998
Population (in million) 2.90 3.20 3.30 3.30
Nominal GDP in USD bn 1.99 2.77 3.34 3.98
Rates of real GDP growth … … … …
Rates of inflation Dec./Dec. - Federation  -39.5 7.7 13.4 5.8
Current account deficit (in USD mln) -570 -1,306 -1,468 -2,005
Current account deficit as % of GDP -26.4 -39.3 -33.0 -33.7
Total import of goods (in USD mln) 1,082 1,882 2,119.8* 2,247.8*
Total export of goods (in USD mln) 152 336 410.2* 549.6*
Total import of goods from EU (in USD mln) … … 854.26 949.57
Total export of goods in EU (in USD mln) … … 180.86 277.11
Stock of M1 end of period (Dec.) (in mln convertable marka) 56.4 354.0 251.68 309.99
Growth rates of M1 Dec./Dec. 333.8 527.7 -28.90 23.17
Stock of M2 end of period (Dec.) (in mln convertable marka) 394,7 774,7 1,178.16 1,546.96
Growth rates of M2 Dec./Dec.  8.8 96.2 52.10 31.30
Total foreign currency deposits - end of period (Dec.) (in mln convertible marka)
334.4 413.6 916.92 1,228.02
Money market interest rates - end of period (Dec.) in % … … … …
Lending interest rates - end of period (Dec.) in % … … … …
Exchange rate against USD, end of period (Dec.)** 143.3 155.5 179.2 1.658
Exchange rate regime 
Currency board; 
KM1=DEM1
Fiscal deficit as % of GDP -0.3 -3.5 -1.1 …
* Partners country's data
** In mid-1997 the convertable marka was introduced as new currency.
 Until the introduction of the KM, the official rate of the Bosnian Dinar was 100 per DEM.
Sources:
1. IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/69 "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Issues"
2. Deutsche Bank Research, March 1999,  table for Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina
4. IMF Paper "IMF Approves augmentation and extension of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Stand-By-Credit"27
Basic Economic Indicators for Bulgaria
1995 1996 1997 1998
Population (in mln) 8.41 8.36 8.33 8.31
Nominal GDP (in USD bn) 13.1 9.9 10.2 12.2
Rates of real GDP growth 2.1 -10.9 -6.9 3.5
Rates of inflation Dec./Dec.  32.9 310.8 578.5 1.0
Current account deficit (in USD mln) -25.6 81.8 445.7 -375.6
Total import of goods (in USD mln) 5,224 4,703 4,518 4,623.5
Total export of goods (in USD mln) 5,345 4,890 4,913 4,299
Total import of goods from EU (in USD mln) 2,097 1,780.3 1,860.6 2,325.3
Total export of goods in EU (in USD mln) 2,012 1,912.4 2,135.9 2,136.8
Stock of M1 end period (Dec.) (in BGL mln) 107,885 236,627 2,290,316 2,826,129
Growth rates of M1 Dec./Dec.  39.6 119.3 867.9 23.4
Stock of M2 end period (Dec.) (in BGL mln) 571,304 1,244,569 5,750,728 6,328,788
Growth rates of M2 Dec./Dec.  39.3 117.8 362.1 10
Total foreign currency deposits-end of period (Dec.) (in BGL mln) 158,763 661,291 2,624,087 2,584,126
Money market interest rates-end of period (Dec.) in % 44.01 442.19 1.58 2.86
Lending interest rates-end of period (Dec.) in % 42.39 227.25 11.83 13.11
Exchange rate against USD, end of period (Dec.) (BGL/USD) 70.7 487.35 1776.5 1675.1
Exchange rate regime floating floating
1997, July 
currency board currency board
Fiscal deficit as % of GDP -5.7 -10.5 -3.1 1.1
Source:
1) IFS June 1999
2) Web site of the Central Bank of Bulgaria 
3) Deutsche Bank Research, table for Republic of Bulgaria  28
Basic Economic Indicators for Croatia
1995 1996 1997 1998
Population (in mln) 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.6
Nominal GDP (in USD bln) 18.8 19.9 20.0 21.3
Rates of real GDP growth 6.8 6.0 6.5 2.3
Rates of inflaton (Dec./Dec)  3.7 3.4 3.8 5.4
Current account deficit (in USD mln) 1,451.5 1,147.5 2,342.6 1,542.9
Total import of goods (in USD mln) 7,900.7 8,235.9 9,434.6 8,773.4
Total export of goods (in USD mln) 4,632.7 4,545.7 4,210.3 4,612.7
Toatal import of goods from EU (in USD mln) 4,663.9 4,625.4 5,411.5 4,979.7
Toatal export of goods in EU (in USD mln) 2,671.9 2,302.6 2,074.2 2,161.1
Stock of M1 (end of period, in HRK mln) 8,234,9 11,368.9 13,731.4 13,531.4
Growth rates of M1 (Dec./Dec)   24.0 38.1 20.8 -1.5
Stock of M4 (end of period, in HRK mln) 24,623.0 36,701.1 50,742.0 57,340.3
Growth rates of M4 (Dec./Dec)   39.3 49.0 38.2 13.0
Total foreign currency deposits (end of period, in HRK mln) 14,099.4 21,817.5 31,278.1 37,970.9
Money market interest rates (end of period, in %, daily market)  27.1 10.4 9.4 15.8
Lending interest rates (end of period, in %, total average on credits in HRK)   22.3 18.5 14.1 16.1
Exchange rates against USD (end of period) 5.3161 5.5396 6.3031 6.2475
Exchange rate regime De facto target band vis-à-vis Deutsche Mark
Fiscal balance (as % of GDP) -0.7 -0.3 -1.0 0.5
Source: National Bank of Croatia29
Basic Economic Indicators for Macedonia
1995 1996 1997 1998
Population (in mln) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1
Nominal GDP (in USD bn) 4.5 4.4 3.7 3.5
Rates of real GDP growth -1.2 0.8 1.5 2.9
Rates of inflaton (Dec./Dec)  9.2 0.2 4.5 -1.0
Current account deficit (in USD mln) 221.34 288.15 275.64 290.31
Total import of goods (in USD mln) 1,424.60 1,463.95 1,588.99 1,722.16
Total export of goods (in USD mln) 1,204.81 1,147.44 1,201.43 1,322.05
Toatal import of goods from EU (in USD mln) 690 630 659 694
Toatal export of goods in EU (in USD mln) 408 490 462 584
Stock of M1 (end of period, in MKD mln) 12,521 12,143 13,985 15,178
Growth rates of M1 (Dec./Dec)   19.1 -3.0 15.2 8.5
Stock of M2 (end of period, in MKD mln) 18,703 18,490 22,724 26,003
Growth rates of M2 (Dec./Dec)   4.8 -1.1 22.9 14.4
Total foreign currency deposits (end of period, in MKD mln) 4,238 3,848 5,940 7,436
Money market interest rates (end of period, in %)  23.3 20.0 19.7 18.1
Lending interest rates (end of period, in %)   26.5 21.6 21.6 20.5
Exchange rates against USD (end of period) 38.1522 41.2702 54.8697 51.7373
Exchange rate regime  Pegged exchange rate against Deutsche Mark
Fiscal deficit (as % of GDP) 1.2 2.5 1.8 2.1*
* Preliminary data
Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia30
Basic Economic Indicators for Romania
1995 1996 1997 1998
Population (in mln) 22.68 22.61 22.57 22.50
Nominal GDP (in USD bn) 35.5 34.8 34.6 36.8
Rates of real GDP growth 7.1 3.6 -6.6 -5.5
Rates of inflation Dec./Dec.  27.8 56.9 151.4 40.6
Current account deficit (in USD mln) -1,800 -2,600 -2,500 -2,900
Total import of goods (in USD mln) 11,300 12,500 12,400 10,700
Total export of goods (in USD mln) 9,400 9,600 9,800 8,300
Total import of goods from EU (in USD mln) 5,700 6,500 5,922 6,829
Total export of goods in EU (in USD mln) 4,900 5,400 4,768 5,358
Stock of M1 - end of period (Dec.) (in ROL mln) 6,771,000 10,749,000 17,942,000 21,115,000
Growth rates of M1 Dec./Dec.  57.6 58.6 66.9 17.7
Stock of M2 - end of period (Dec.) (in ROL mln) 17,107,000 30,316,000 62,145,000 92,525,000
Growth rates of M2 Dec./Dec. 70.1 67.4 104.9 48.8
Total foreign currency deposits - end of period (Dec.) (in ROL mln) 3,953,000 7,086,000 17,681,000 30,200,000
Money market interest rates - end of period (Dec.) in % … 71.7 138.8 264.0
Weighted lending interest rates - end of period (Dec.) in % 59.3 69.9 72.2 77.4
Exchange rate against USD, end of period (Dec.) (ROL/USD) 2,578.0 4,035.0 8,023.0 10,951.0
Exchange rate regime  floating 
managed 
float
Fiscal deficit as % of GDP -2.6 -3.8 -3.6 -4.1
Sources: IFS
               Monthly Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance of Romania - June, 1999
           Deutsche Bank research
               World Economic Outlook31
Basic economic indicators for Yugoslavia
1995 1996 1997 1998
Population (in million) 10.56 10.62 10.68 10.70
Nominal GDP (in USD bn) 19.6 13.8 15.8 13.3
Rates of real GDP growth 6.5 5.8 7.4 2.6
Rates of inflation Dec./Dec.  … 58.7 9.4 46.0
Current account deficit (in USD mln) … -1,900 -2,100 -1,900
Current account deficit as % of GDP … 13.8 13.3 14.3
Total import of goods (in USD mln) … 4,100 4,800 4,800
Total export of goods (in USD mln) … 1,800 2,700 2,900
Total import of goods from EU (in USD mln) … … 2,000 1,900
Total export of goods in EU (in USD mln) … … 1,200 1,100
Stock of M1 in million dinars end of period (Dec.) 3,256.10 5,495.30 9,148 10,773.30
Growth rates of M1 Dec./Dec. 33.7 68.8 66.5 17.8
Stock of M2 in million dinars end of period (Dec.) 4,198.70 7,360.50 11,927.70 14,384.50
Growth rates of M2 Dec./Dec.  42.6 75.3 62.1 20.6
Total foreign currency deposits - end of period (Dec.) in million dinars 22,902.40 23,866.50 27,467 50,491.10
Money market interest rates - end of period (Dec.) in % … … … …
Weighted lending interest rates - end of period (Dec.) in % 73.49 196.68 71.77 4.09
Exchange rate against USD, end of period (Dec.) 4.7424 5.1322 5.9123 10.0308
Exchange rate regime  … … … …
Fiscal deficit as % of GDP … … … …
Sources:
1. Deutsche Bank Research, March 1999, table for Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
2. "Bilten Narodne banke Jugoslavije XXII godina - br.2 * Februar 1999"